Asiaweek 111795 by sangit pambudi

Asiaweek 111795

OKINAWA

September 15, 1999

Mr. Otas position isnt likely to mean much, though. Mr. Murayama, a socialist and, until last year, a staunch opponent of the bases, has few real options as the U.S.Japan Security Treaty is the cornerstone of his countrys foreign and defense policy. He can sign the leases himself, which is within his authority, or resign as PM, in which case someone else will do it.

Either way, the Americans will be staying on Okinawa for some time. Earlier this year, Washington pledged to keep 100,000 troops in Asia. Almost half are based in Japan 27,000 on Okinawa and another 36,000 are in South Korea. The deployment on the island is not only essential to Americas Korean detachment, but also gives Washington a forward base to the entire region. Besides, most Asian governments support a continued U.S. military presence in the neighborhood. And Americas own expanding economic interests in Asia make any quick withdrawal unlikely. So, responding to the Okinawa furor, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry offered to move troops around to defuse tensions but not to trim their numbers.

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In the longer term, though, growing Asian nationalism and American isolationism will combine to reduce the U.S. presence. The writing began to appear on the wall in 1992, when the Philippines, one of Americas closest allies in the region, terminated Washingtons longstanding leases on the key bases of Clark and Subic Bay after a heated domestic debate. That coincided with a desire in the U.S., after the Cold War, to trim military expenditure and stay out of overseas entanglements. In Japan, trade frictions with Washington spurred increasing resentment of the American presence even before the Okinawa incident. And Korean impatience with U.S. forces perceived highhandedness is growing.

It is time Asias governments faced up to the implications of these trends. Above all, they must learn to take responsibility for maintaining peace and security in their own backyard, without looking reflexively to Washington as a provider and a pathpointer. Today, America is a needed and welcome presence in the region because historical antagonisms, as welll as rivalries rooted in the Cold War, have conspired to divide Asian countries. Governments talk precious little with one another on sensitive matters of defense, and collective security is an alien notion.

Unless managed properly, regional tensions will rise and jeopardize Asias cherished stability and prosperity. The emergence of China as a major economic power has spurred a modernization drive among the Chinese armed forces. That predictably worries Beijings neighbors, some of which are boosting their own military forces. The regions potential flashpoints Korea, Taiwan, the Spratly islands remain hot.

While the U.S. is still ready and able to help maintain the balance of power, Asian countries must start taking decisive steps toward collective security. The first move, clearly, must be dialogue friendly but frank talk that will help the regions governments understand one anothers security concerns. That will help build mutual trust, an essential ingredient.

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The ASEAN Regional Forum ARF is a good beginning. Set up in 1993, it seeks to promote dialogue among Asian countries and other major Pacific powers. Its eventual aim is to replace a U.S.dominated security net with an interlocking Asian system in which America would have an important, though lesser, role. Talk is growing of an Asian security stool with four legs China, Japan, the U.S. and Russia. That would provide for a balance of influence on the regions defense matters among the big powers.

If collective security is to work in Asia, traditional rivals China and Japan must develop good working relations. Despite their mutual suspicions, common economic interests give Beijing and Tokyo reason aplenty to improve ties. The U.S. can play a key role in facilitating trust between the two. That would serve not only Washingtons own interests but also the regions. To do so effectively, the U.S. will need to resist the temptation to play Japan and China off against each other.